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I n In re Timothy F, 343 Md. 371,681 A.2d 501 (1996), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that the intent of a juvenile 
defendant must be twofold in order 
to be found guilty of possessing a 
non-controlled substance with the 
intent to distribute it as a con-
trolled dangerous substance. First, 
the defendant must have intended 
to distribute the substance, and 
second, the defendant must have 
intended to misrepresent it as a 
controlled dangerous substance. 
A student in Centerville Mid-
dle School reported to the principal 
that the petitioner ("Timothy"), a 
twelve year-old sixth grade stu-
dent, possessed a controlled dan-
gerous substance ("CDS"). The 
principal's search of the child re-
vealed a pill bottle containing two 
pieces and three crumbs of a sub-
stance that significantly resembled 
crack cocaine. Timothy asserted 
that they were dried milk chips, 
and subsequent laboratory tests 
confirmed that they were not co-
caine. Timothy claimed that he 
received the milk chips from an 
eighth grade student, Stanley, and 
that he subsequently distributed 
some of the substance to another 
sixth grader, Giovanni. During 
these exchanges, neither Stanley 
nor Timothy claimed that the milk 
chips were crack cocaine. 
Both Stanley and Giovanni 
were called to the principal's of-
fice and questioned about the sub-
stance in Timothy's possession. 
Giovanni had a brown prescription 
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bottle containing two or three 
pieces of the same substance, and 
he told the principal that they were 
soap chips. Stanley had a bottle 
containing several pieces of the 
substance, and he stated that the 
substance was "fake crack." As a 
result of the principal's investiga-
tion, Timothy was charged with 
intent to distribute a non-
controlled substance intended for 
use or distribution as a CDS. 
The Circuit Court for Queen 
Anne's County, sitting as a juve-
nile court, entered a delinquency 
judgment against Timothy for pos-
session of a non-controlled sub-
stance with intent to distribute it as 
a CDS in violation of Article 27, 
section 286B of the Maryland An-
notated Code. The court of special 
appeals affirmed, and the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari. 
The court began its analysis by 
reviewing the applicable statute 
which provides, in pertinent part, 
that 
It is unlawful for a person 
to distribute, attempt to 
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distribute, or possess with 
intent to distribute, any 
non-controlled substance 
intended by that person for 
use or distribution as a 
controlled dangerous sub-
stance or under circum-
stances where one reason-
ably should know that the 
non-controlled substance 
will be used or distributed 
for use as a controlled dan-
gerous substance. 
In re Timothy F 343 Md. at 377, 
681 A.2d at 504 (quoting MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286B(c) 
(1992)). The court stated that it is 
not enough to show that Timothy 
possessed the substance; the State 
must also prove the purpose for 
which Timothy possessed it. Id at 
377-78,681 A.2d at 504. There-
fore, two intentions, rather than 
one, must be present to sustain a 
delinquency judgment for this of-
fense. It must be shown that 
Timothy not only intended to dis-
tribute the substance, but that he 
also intended to do so by mis-
representing it as crack cocaine or 
some other CDS. Id at 378, 681 
A.2d at 504 (citing Gipe v. State, 
55 Md. App. 604, 466 A.2d 40, 46 
(1983)). 
The court of appeals 
entertained the State's argument 
that intent may be inferred from 
the manner in which the substance 
was packaged. A police officer 
testified at trial that "a lot of 
people that carry crack cocaine or 
any kind of CDS carry it in a 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 35 
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container like [the pill bottle the 
petitioner was carrying] .... " Jd. 
at 375, 681 A.2d at 503. He 
further testified that a user does 
not keep crack in such a container 
unless he or she is a "user seller." 
Jd. The State relied on Gipe v. 
State, 55 Md. App. 604,466 A.2d 
40, 46 (1983), a case in which an 
adult defendant was arrested when 
he was found to possess caffeine 
tablets that were packaged and 
resembled street amphetamines. In 
re Timothy F, 343 Md. at 378,681 
A.2d at 504. The Gipe court held 
that "the quantity and packaging of 
the pills could give rise to the 
logical inference that these pills 
were to be sold." Jd. at 379, 681 
A.2d at 505 (quoting Gipe v. State, 
55 Md. App. at 614-15, 466 A.2d 
at 45-46). 
The state also relied on 
Timothy's knowledge about the 
nature, appearance, and packaging 
of crack cocaine that he learned 
from the instructors in the middle 
school's Drug and Alcohol Resis-
tance Education ("DARE") pro-
gram. Jd. at 375-76, 681 A.2d at 
503. The State argued that this 
knowledge showed that Timothy 
was aware of how drugs were 
distributed and could, therefore, 
possess the requisite intent to 
distribute them. The defense al-
leged that Timothy and the other 
boys were play-acting as drug 
dealers and did not possess the 
uncontrolled substance with the in-
tent of distributing it for use or as 
a CDS. Jd. at 376, 681 A.2d at 
503. 
The court noted that the stan-
dard of review in both criminal 
27.1 U. Bait. L.F. 36 
and juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings is whether, after viewing the 
evidence in the light most favor-
able to the prosecution, any 
rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Jd. at 380, 681 A.2d at 505. The 
court then noted that section 
286B(d) of the statute offers three 
factors to determine whether the 
prosecution was reasonable: (1) the 
nature of the packaging of the non-
controlled substance; (2) whether 
there was an attempt to distribute 
the non-controlled substance in ex-
change for money; and (3) whether 
the non-controlled substance was 
substantially identical to a CDS. 
Jd. at 381, 681 A.2d at 506 (citing 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286B(d) 
(1992)). Applying these guide-
lines, the court determined that the 
substance was, indeed, packaged 
for distribution. 
Furthermore, the court stated 
that because Timothy was enrolled 
in the DARE program, he most 
likely understood the significance 
of this packaging. Jd. at 381-82, 
681 A.2d at 506. In addition, the 
substance had actually been dis-
tributed on two occasions - once 
from Stanley to Timothy and again 
from Timothy to Giovanni. Jd. at 
382, 681 A.2d at 506. There was 
no testimony, however, proving 
that either the nature of the sub-
stance was misrepresented or that 
the substance was exchanged for 
money or property. Id. Therefore, 
all three elements had not been 
proven by the State. 
Before concluding, the court 
factored the petitioner's age into 
the analysis. Judge Bell stated that 
there is a rebuttable presumption 
of criminal incapacity in children 
between the ages of seven and 
fourteen. Jd. at 383,681 A.2d 507. 
He noted that children Timothy'S 
age may play "cops and robbers," 
and that even though children may 
appear as if they are committing a 
crime, the surrounding circum-
stances often indicate that they are 
merely pretending, rather than in-
tending to do so. Jd. Therefore, 
while the State's evidence was suf-
ficient to prove that Timothy in-
tended to distribute some of the 
milk chips in his possession, the 
evidence was insufficient to prove 
that he intended to misrepresent 
them as a CDS. Jd. at 384, 681 
A.2d at 507 (citing Felkner v. 
State, 218 Md. 300, 146 A.2d 424 
(1958)). 
Significantly, the instant case 
requires that the State prove not 
only one, but two intents to sustain 
a charge of possession of a non-
controlled substance with the in-
tent to distribute it as a CDS in a 
juvenile delinquency proceeding. 
It ensures that children, whose be-
havior may be misinterpreted as 
illegal, are protected from pro-
secution when they are only pre-
tending to commit crimes. While 
this decision protects the interests 
of the juvenile, it ignores the per-
vasive problem of drug distribu-
tion by refusing to sanction chil-
dren who glorify and mimic illegal 
activity. This decision preserves 
the prosecution's difficult task of 
proving two intents and minimizes 
the number of potential convic-
tions for a violation of the statute. 
